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 Diplomacy in the Pacific—At Least Not Yet 
 
By Jonathan Pryke  
 
In an atmosphere of heightened geostrategic competition, China’s Belt and 
Road Initiative (BRI) has raised questions about the risk of debt problems in 
less-developed countries. Such risks are especially worrying for the small and 
fragile economies of the Pacific. 
      China is not the only donor in the region, nor the most significant. In any given 
year, more than 60 donors invest more than US$2 billion in aid in the Pacific, equal 
to around 7 percent of the region’s total gross domestic product (GDP). The vast 
majority of aid comes in the form of grants. These flows of aid are complex and 
opaque, and the lack of transparency hampers efforts of donors to coordinate 
and of recipient governments to align aid with their own priorities. 
      In response to concerns about this level of borrowing, the Lowy Institute 
created the Lowy Institute Pacific Aid Map, a database with information on 
20,000 projects supported by 62 donors, ranging from 2011 to today. 
     Drawing on this unique database and complemented by International 
Monetary Fund (IMF) reporting on the region, the Lowy Institute released a 
report in October 2019 assessing the narrative that China is engaged in debt-
trap diplomacy in the Pacific. Although the report does not find evidence of 
debt-trap diplomacy at present, the sheer scale of China’s lending in a short 
time and its lack of strong institutional mechanisms to protect the sustainability 
of borrowing countries pose clear risks. 
 
Debt sustainability risk in the Pacific 
The Pacific is, by some margin, the most aid-dependent region in the world. 
Difficult economic geography drives an enormous need for development 
 financing, creating a predictable pressure towards potentially  unsustainable 
 fiscal policies and debt accumulation. Pacific countries have struggled to 
 sustain a modest pace of sustained economic growth, and many investments—
even in economic infrastructure that is usually considered growth-enhancing, 
such as roads, ports, and power generation—struggle to generate an adequate 
return to justify the cost. 
      Chinese aid in the Pacific has predominantly supported infrastructure develop-
ment. Chinese assistance is perceived to be faster, more responsive to the needs of local 
political elites, and with fewer conditions attached than other assistance. As one senior 
Pacific bureaucrat put it: “We like China because they bring red flags, not red tape.” 
      Six Pacific governments are currently debtors to China—Cook Islands, Fiji, 
Papua New Guinea, Samoa, Tonga, and Vanuatu—although only Papua New 
Guinea and Vanuatu have taken on new Chinese loans since 2016. Three small 
countries—Tonga, Samoa, and Vanuatu—are particularly heavily indebted. 
      While the IMF does not currently consider any Pacific country to be in 
debt distress, the risks have become notably worse over time. A primary driver 
 behind rising debt risk is the impact of large economic shocks, especially 
 natural disasters. Recent tropical cyclones have caused estimated damage worth 
more than 60 percent of GDP in Vanuatu and almost 40 percent and 30 percent 
of GDP in Tonga and Samoa, respectively. Economic mismanagement has also 
been important, particularly in Papua New Guinea where large budget deficits 
have triggered a sharp increase in public debt. 
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Natural disasters and 
other vulnerabilities 
lower the ability of  Pacific 
economies to carry large 
amounts of debt, even at 
favorable terms. 
 
The sheer volume of 
 Chinese loans, combined 
with the lack of strong 
 institutional mechanisms 
to prevent potentially 
 unsustainable lending, is 
cause for  concern.
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China’s role as a lender  
in the Pacific: Four key points 
 
Volume of lending. While China is a 
major lender in the Pacific, it is not a 
dominant creditor. From 2011 to 2017, 
China was responsible for 37 percent of 
all official loans disbursed in the region. 
Traditional creditors, including the 
Asian Development Bank (ADB), 
the World Bank, the IMF, Japan, and 
Canada, provided more than 60  percent 
of all official lending. Overall, official 
financing flows to the Pacific have been 
declining in importance, driven by a 
sharp reduction in grant financing—
notably from Australia. 
 
Quality of projects. The Pacific is 
 littered with failed infrastructure 
 projects, funded by a variety of donors. 
A 2014 analysis, based on case studies 
in Cook Islands, Samoa, Tonga, and 
Vanuatu, presented a mixed report 
card on the quality of Chinese projects, 
with some performing much better 
than others. The key determinants 
of effectiveness were the approach to 
 negotiations taken by Pacific Island 
 governments plus overall project 
oversight. 
 
Lending terms. According to Lowy 
Institute Pacific Aid Map data, 97 
percent of China’s official loans in 
the Pacific have been in the form of 
 concessional loans from its EXIM 
Bank. Standard EXIM concessional 
loans are denominated in renminbi, 
with an interest rate of 2 percent, a grace 
period of 5–7 years, and a  maturity 
of 15–20 years. By international 
 standards, these lending terms are 
quite favorable. Nonetheless, exposure 
to natural disasters and other vulnera-
bilities lowers the ability of Pacific 
economies to carry large amounts of 
debt, even at favorable terms. 
 
Lending to countries already at risk. 
Overall, China has not directed its 
lending towards countries that are 
 already at a high risk of debt distress. 
Ten percent of Chinese bilateral loans 
have gone to countries at high risk, 
compared to 70 percent of bilateral 
loans from Taiwan, for example. 
 Nevertheless, the sheer volume of 
 Chinese loans, combined with the lack 
of strong institutional mechanisms 
to prevent potentially unsustainable 
 lending, is cause for future concern. 
 
Looking ahead 
A close look at the evidence suggests 
that China has not been engaged in 
debt-trap diplomacy in the Pacific, 
at least not so far. Nonetheless, if 
 future Chinese lending continues 
on a business-as-usual basis, serious 
 problems of debt sustainability will 
arise, and concerns about quality and 
corruption are valid. 
      There have been recent signs that 
both China and Pacific Island govern-
ments recognize the need for reform. 
China needs to adopt formal lending 
rules similar to those of the multilateral 
development banks, providing more 
favorable terms to countries at greater 
risk of debt distress. Alternative 
 approaches might include replacing 
or partially replacing EXIM loans with 
the interest-free loans and grants that 
the Chinese Ministry of Commerce 
already provides. 
      Introducing formal lending rules 
would offer certain advantages for 
China. Implementation would be 
 relatively straightforward and would 
require only modest additional 
 coordination efforts. It would also 
 encourage greater cooperation and 
 coordination between China, the IMF, 
and other official creditors,  helping 
to reduce some of the geopolitical 
 tensions surrounding the BRI. 
      Adopting formal lending rules 
would also help borrowing countries 
manage their debt more sustainably. 
Today, China’s state firms often engage 
directly with political elites when 
seeking agreement for new projects. In 
weaker-governance environments, this 
can mean bypassing the local finance 
officials normally responsible for 
 advising on such matters. While final 
decisions will always rest at the  political 
level, such practices undermine the 
ability of Pacific nations to  manage 
their debt effectively. Clear rules 
 anchoring Chinese lending to a formal 
assessment of debt sustainability could 
help address these issues by mandating 
early engagement with the finance 
 officials of recipient countries on any 
new lending plans. 
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